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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT, OWNER,
AND ATHLETIC DISCIPLINE IN THE NFL & NBA
JOSHUA S.E. LEE* & JAIMIE K. MCFARLIN**
This article serves to discuss the current landscape of professional sports
discipline and commissioner power in the NFL & NBA, specifically under-
standing the discipline of management and ownership in the major leagues
as compared to player discipline when franchise ownership interests and
commissioner power conflict.  Furthermore, these particular events illuminate
the differences between discipline in professional sports and non-sports
contexts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past year, the NFL and the NBA, two of the largest and
most prominent American professional sports leagues, have been at
the center of discipline disputes and scandals that have made head-
lines and changed the perception of labor and employee discipline
in sports.  In the NFL, player and owner scandals, ranging from the
saga of former Baltimore Ravens running back Ray Rice to the
travails of Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay, have brought intense
scrutiny and criticism on the league office and commissioner Roger
Goodell.  Goodell’s NBA counterpart, Adam Silver, has been busy
in his first year in office as commissioner, taking strong, decisive
positions on several NBA scandals, including those of two owners,
former Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling and soon-to-be
former Atlanta Hawks owner Bruce Levenson.  With these two
leagues holding premier status in America’s sports echelon and
holding significant promise of growth and expansion into the fu-
ture, these scandals have implicated a possible shift in sports labor
discipline that could echo for years to come.
Previous articles have summarized and analyzed commissioner
power within the confines of labor law1 and antitrust case
1. See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League Commissioners’ Authority
and Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 179 (2010); Joshua A.
Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How Independent Arbitrators
Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359 (2010); Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discre-
tion Is Too Much For The Commissioner To Have Over The Players’ Off-The-Field Conduct?,
17 SPORTS L. J. 167, 180 (2010); Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really
2
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law.2  That backdrop serves as great context to discuss the current
landscape of professional sports discipline and commissioner
power, specifically understanding the discipline of management
and ownership in the major leagues as compared to player disci-
pline when franchise ownership interests and commissioner power
conflict.  Furthermore, these particular events illuminate the differ-
ences between discipline in professional sports and non-sports
contexts.
What is perhaps the most unique aspect of the league events of
2014 is that the discipline handed down from the commissioners
were not solely reserved for players.  NBA and NFL players have
long been subject to almost unilateral discipline by their respective
commissioner offices.3  Dating back to the inception of each of
these leagues, the commissioner’s office has been imbued with
wide-ranging labor management and disciplinary power.4  The cen-
tral importance of sports to American society has been given as a
reason for this large spread of power: “If professional sports are to
Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631 (2009); David Sirotkin, Note,
Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports: An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary
and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commissioners, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 289, 292 (2009); Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football
League Players Association: How Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union’s
Members by Not Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1581, 1596 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption
Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63 (2007); Scott A. Freedman,
Comment, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second Circuit’s Blanket Application
of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 155
(2004).
3. See Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports
Leagues and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 576 (2009) (dis-
cussing indeterminate and “seemingly boundless discretion” granted to commis-
sioners across major professional sports leagues in considering and meting out
discipline).
4. See, e.g., Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1059 n.66 (1996) (“In 1973, NFL Commissioner Pete Ro-
zelle suspended Dallas Cowboys receiver Lance Renzel after two indecent exposure
convictions and a drug possession charge. Although both Renzel and the NFL Play-
ers Association filed suit challenging the suspension as ‘arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory,’ both federal and state courts refused to overturn the Commis-
sioner’s action.” (citations omitted)).  The NBA requires an “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard of review for commissioner punishments under the NBA Collective
Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXI, sec. 8(b). See In re Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n
on behalf of Player Latrell Sprewell and Warriors Basketball Club and Nat’l Basket-
ball Ass’n, 591 PLI/Pat 469, 482-83 (2000).  For a detailed discussion of the Latrell
Sprewell arbitration for his altercation with a coach, see Sarah D. Katz, Note, “Rep-
utations . . . A Lifetime to Build, Seconds to Destroy”: Maximizing the Mutually Protective
Value of Morals Clauses in Talent Agreements, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185,
232 (2011).
3
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maintain their revered status in American society, the public must
have confidence that the contests it sees are genuine and real.”5
The amount of time, money, and emotional involvement that the
average American fan puts into sports, combined with the image
that success in American professional sports is based on merit, hard
work, and, often, luck, emphasizes the importance that league con-
tests, from the regular season through the playoffs, are real, and
not based on a pre-written script.  The distinction is a fine one, as
viewing professional sports can truly be classified as a leisure activ-
ity.  Yet over time, a public trust, built on these ideals, has devel-
oped around professional sports and if that trust is not upheld,
interest in sports could theoretically vanish.6
In cases of disputes over punishments, courts, arbitrators, and
leagues have previously applied an “arbitrary and capricious” stan-
dard to commissioner decisions in some major American profes-
sional sports leagues.7  Commissioner decisions have rarely been
found to be in violation of this rather broad test.8  The most com-
mon reason for upholding these broad commissioner powers has
been this idea that a commissioner is entrusted with wide authority
to “protect the best interests of the game.”9  This idea seems nebu-
5. Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests”
Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1646-49
(1999).
6. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 3, at 580 (discussing MLB commissioners’ use
of “best interest” clause to block trade that would have eroded public confidence).
7. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1649; NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
art. XXXI, sec. 9 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NBA CBA], available at http://www
.nbpa.org/cba/2011 (“A dispute involving (i) a fine of more than $50,000 and/
or a suspension of more than twelve (12) games that is imposed upon a player by
the Commissioner (or his designee) for conduct on the playing court, or (ii) an
action taken by the Commissioner (or his designee) that (A) concerns the preser-
vation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of
basketball and (B) results in a financial impact on the player of more than
$50,000, shall be processed and determined in the same manner as a Grievance
under Sections 2-7 above; provided, however, that the Grievance Arbitrator shall
apply an ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of review.”); accord Finley v. Kuhn, 569
F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying “arbitrary and capricious” standard to disci-
plinary actions of Major League Baseball commissioner).
8. See Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 545 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring); Molinas v. NBA, 190
F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upholding NBA President Maurice Podoloff’s indefi-
nite suspension of Jack Molinas for gambling on team that drafted him -Fort
Wayne Pistons).
9. See CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION art.
35(d) (2012) [hereinafter NBA CONST.], available at http://mediacentral.nba
.com/media/mediacentral/NBA-Constitution-and-By-Laws.pdf (granting NBA
Commissioner power to discipline “[a]ny Player who, in [the Commissioner’s]
opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct prejudicial . . . or detrimental to the
[NBA]”); CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. VIII
(2006) [hereinafter NFL CONST.], available at http://www.nfl.com/static/content/
4
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lous on its face and designed to entrench power in the hands of the
current sports elite, namely the franchise owners and the commis-
sioners.  In truth, who decides what is best for the game? What if
they are wrong?
Despite these legitimate questions, this standard still persists,
founded in a somewhat gray area of sporting morals, common
sense, and social values.10  While these leagues are constantly evolv-
ing in other aspects, including on important issues such as concus-
sions11  and racial divides,12  the powers of the commissioners have
remained relatively unchanged and unbound by a strict framework.
Yet, there has been a rash of unprecedented ownership and player
discipline stories during 2014, which threatens to upend our cur-
rent understanding of commissioner discipline and labor issues in
sports.  Historical standards have been challenged, for both better
and worse, as commissioners Goodell and Silver have taken a new
public/static/html/careers/pdf/co.pdf; cf. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT app. C, para. 15, 2006-2012 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NFL CBA] (enabling
NFL Commissioner to discipline an athlete who acts in a manner that is “detrimen-
tal to the League or professional football”); see also Kim & Parlow, supra note 6 at
576 (discussing general grant of indeterminate discretion to the commissioner in
considering and meting out discipline based on “best interest” clause); Pollack,
supra note 5 (discussing best interest power in different professional sports
leagues).
10. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 6 at 595 (discussing “moral underpinnings of
these punitive decisions suggest[ing] that sports leagues embrace governance form
of organization—which pursues broad social values over narrow, private goals—
further reinforcing its public rather than private conceptualization”); Robert Am-
brose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct Policy, the
NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1069, 1108
(2008) (discussing  values that NFL must prioritize in order to properly enforce its
conduct policy).
11. For the history of the NFL’s policies and litigation regarding concussions,
see generally Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem and Saving Professional
Football, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 127 (2013); Michael Telis, Note, Playing Through
the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and Section 301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J.
1841, 1842 (2014); Daniel S. Goldberg, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, the National
Football League, and the Manufacture of Doubt: An Ethical, Legal, and Historical Analysis,
34 J. LEGAL MED. 157 (2013).  The NBA followed the lead of the other major pro-
fessional sports leagues and similarly implemented a concussion protocol in De-
cember of 2011. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Concussion Policy Becomes Major Factor in
Series, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/sports/
basketball/concussion-protocols-loom-large-after-injury-to-pacers-george-hill
.html?_r=0.
12. For example, in the NFL, race is implicated in the affirmative action poli-
cies for hiring coaches, known as the “Rooney Rule.” See Jeremi Duru, The Fritz
Pollard Alliance, the Rooney Rule, and the Quest to “Level the Playing Field” in the National
Football League, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 179 (2008); Brian W. Collins, Note, Tack-
ling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 870 (2007); Michael Corey Dawson, Comment, A Change Must Come: All Racial
Barriers Precluding Minority Representation in Managerial Positions on Professional Sports
Teams Must Be Eliminated, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 551 (1999).
5
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lead on ownership and player discipline.  Undoubtedly, the fast-
paced, internet culture that dominates today’s social conversation
has played a huge role.13  Scandals and discipline that previously
might have taken place behind closed doors, such as the case of
Donald Sterling, have played out in the national spotlight and have,
in essence, forced each commissioner’s hands in addressing and
solving these serious discipline issues.  With the media further em-
boldened by these stories, it is conceivable that any future owner or
player discipline is going to play out under a new light and under a
different paradigm.  This paper’s ambit is to capture at least some
of what this paradigm shift will encompass and what labor disci-
pline will resemble in these leagues as we approach the end of an-
other decade.
In the field of labor law and employee discipline, the profes-
sional sports workplace is different.  Two key differences emerge
with regards to player and management discipline in professional
sports as compared to other common workplace environments.
The first is the notion of punishment with regards to the power and
role of publicity in disciplinary proceedings.  The second distin-
guishing feature stems from the unique labor market of profes-
sional sports as a franchised monopoly with high-skilled workers.
So while it is clear that sports employment is different, it has
not yet been determined how these new developments and issues
will affect the discipline landscape in the NBA and the NFL.  Is this
the beginning of an entirely new era of sports discipline? One that
is more transparent and subject to the influence of the viewing pub-
lic? It remains to be seen but it appears that these leagues are on a
precipice of a drastic change in management and employee disci-
pline.  Goodell and Silver have seen the power of their offices ex-
pand greatly since 2014 and have used this expansion in power in a
familiar manner: in pursuit of what they consider to be in the best
interests of the game and the league.  The end goals are the same.
13. See, e.g., Laurie Nicole Robinson, Comment, Professional Athletes Held to a
Higher Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and
the Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1327 (1998); see
also Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, Psychological
Theory and Empirical Research, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 565 (2006) (“Re-
search has found that athletes are stereotyped by the public as violent, drug abus-
ing, and lacking intelligence.”).  One author explores journalists’ motivations for
covering such stories and what that trend says about popular culture, sports, and
news reporting. See Robinson, supra, at 1324 (recalling time when the media pro-
tected professional athletes as one where athletes and reporters made similar sala-
ries and were both predominantly white); see also generally, David Ray Papke, Athletes
in Trouble with the Law: Journalistic Accounts for the Resentful Fan, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 449 (2001).
6
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But the process utilized by each of these leagues has been markedly
different.  In the NFL’s case, Goodell has kept much of the status
quo, doling out punishments underneath an archaic disciplinary
system, often with uneven results.  He has taken a harsh stand on
player discipline, while continuing to maintain his close relation-
ship with league owners and other executives.  On the other hand,
his NBA counterpart, Adam Silver, has taken drastic, unprece-
dented steps to discipline team owners and expand the disciplinary
powers of his office.
Juxtaposing the actions taken by these two commissioners in
the face of huge disciplinary challenges reveals a new shift in under-
standing and expanse of sport commissioner power.  This shift en-
tails a greater willingness, even an expectation, of the general
public to support commissioner discipline in the best interests of
the game.  It is also a shift that comes during a time of unmatched
access and insight of the media and viewing public into the per-
sonal scandals of the league, due, in part, to our increasingly inva-
sive digital culture.  We will begin in Section B by examining the
professional sports labor and discipline system, focusing specifically
on what makes the sports workplace different and what defines and
gives shape to the disciplinary processes employed by professional
sports leagues like the NFL and NBA.  Next, in Section C, we will
focus on summarizing recent examples of player and management
discipline in the NFL and NBA in 2014 and compare and contrast
the NFL’s approach to discipline to that of the NBA.  In Section D,
we will view this discussion of sports discipline in a larger context
and how sports leagues are a unique workplace compared to other
industries in terms of management and employee discipline.  Fi-
nally, in Section E, we make some predictions as to where this tu-
multuous year will leave management and employee discipline in
sports for decades to come.
II. THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LABOR SYSTEM
AND PLAYER DISCIPLINE
A. The Sports Workplace
Sports differ from other workplaces.  While you often hear
players and coaches refer to their positions as “their jobs,” which
they indeed are, professional sports leagues hold a unique place in
the American labor system.  Professional sports employ highly, but
specifically, skilled workers.  As league entities, both the NBA and
the NFL are the single largest employers of their respective sports
7
Lee and McFarlin: Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: Comparative Analysis of Manage
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
76 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 69
within the United States.14  The Seventh Circuit describes the man-
agement of professional sports leagues as “an exception, anomaly
and aberration.”15  They are organizations in which a collective en-
tity, the league itself, is co-owned by a group of very rich and power-
ful owners.16  Their owners appoint an individual, the
commissioner, to make decisions and carry out mandates for the
good of the sport as a whole.  This commissioner’s power with re-
gards to league-related issues is almost absolute, especially in the
case of player discipline.17  The model for the current day sports
commissioner truly began in baseball in the mid-20th century and
was soon copied by other leagues, which were hoping for similar
success.18
In the NFL, the commissioner’s current wide-ranging authority
was born during the tenure of Pete Rozelle.  Rozelle’s work in se-
curing the league’s first television contract and increasing league-
wide prosperity prompted a greater expansion of the powers of the
office of the commissioner, including “full, complete, and final ju-
risdiction and authority [over] any dispute involving a member or
members in the League.”19
In the NBA, the current model of discipline emerged with the
signing of the 1995 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  Pre-
vious to that point, and dating back to the inception of the league,
the NBA commissioner’s disciplinary decisions were considered fi-
nal.20  The 1995 CBA changed the grievance mechanism and al-
lowed for an introduction of an arbitrator into the process.21  The
current NBA CBA melds together two different standards of review.
The first standard is the well-established “arbitrary and capricious”
review that has been in place through sports discipline for decades.
However, the second standard can be articulated as a “just cause”
standard: “whether there has been just cause for the penalty im-
posed.”22  These dual standards provide an extra level of scrutiny
14. See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balanc-
ing the Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221,
1237 (2012) (asserting that “[t]here are no other ‘sellers’ equivalent to profes-
sional sports leagues and no equivalent ‘buyers’ for professional athletes’ skills”)




18. See id. at 1676–79.
19. See id.; see also Parlow, supra note 1, at 185–89.
20. See Pollack, supra note 5 at 1676–79.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1703–04.
8
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and review for NBA commissioner discipline.  Opening the process
to a neutral arbitrator lends not only power to the players, but also
legitimacy to commissioner discipline and rule.
There is a tension in the relationship between the unique na-
ture of sports and the expansive power of commissioner discipline.
It manifests on several fronts.  First, it presumes that the private
lives of athletes, and owners, are relevant to their on-field careers
and conduct.  Second, commissioner discipline is often rigid and,
especially in the case of the NFL, the last word on the situation.
Finally, league commissioners, including those in the NFL and
NBA, have developed their powers from negotiations and decisions
that seem archaic in today’s world.  Many of the current en-
trenched notions of commissioner discipline evolved during the
nascent years of sports leagues in America in the 1950s and 1960s.23
It was during that time that commissioner discipline first began to
take shape and little change has been made in the intervening de-
cades.  Although the power of the commissioner is supposed to be
subject to collective bargaining, much of current power of commis-
sioners, like Silver and Goodell, has not been at the forefront of
CBA negotiations but rather has been grandfathered in from this
earlier time.  This has left commissioner discipline in a somewhat of
an awkward fit with today’s evolving league landscape and growing
scrutiny from a concerned public.
B. Sports Employee Discipline and Labor Law
The commissioners of the major sports leagues in America
hold “broad powers to protect ‘the integrity of, and public confi-
dence in,’ their respective sports, and thus determine the ‘best in-
terests’ of their leagues.”24  Early case precedent, which has been
nominally followed by most courts, has given a high level of defer-
ence to commissioner decisions that were made in the best interests
of the game.25  This “best interests” power most often extends not
only to on-court decisions, affecting the rules of the game, but also
off-the-court discipline of players and other personnel.26  Under
federal labor law, employee and management discipline are terms
and conditions of employment and mandatory subjects of collective
23. See id. at 1676–79.
24. Id. at 1647 (citations omitted).
25. See Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 177–78 (1998); see also Parlow, supra note 1, at
190–91.
26. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1646–49.
9
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bargaining.27  The CBAs allow for league individuals to be disci-
plined by the commissioner and, in the case of most leagues, appeal
that discipline to an outside arbitrator.28  When discussing manage-
ment and employee discipline in professional sports, particularly
with the NBA and the NFL, it is key to look first at the CBAs of both
leagues, and the power those CBAs give commissioners in terms of
player and owner discipline.
The CBA is the “‘supreme governing authority’ concerning
employment in professional sports leagues.”29  It offers the commis-
sioner “almost autonomous authority within the internal structure
of the league, uncontrolled by its principal owners.”30  Central to
the creation of the CBA is the collective bargaining process, en-
gaged in by the players union, ownership, and the league every few
years.31  The process is provided for by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (“NLRA”).32  The National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) has jurisdiction over professional sports leagues and ap-
plies the NLRA, allowing player unions to form and negotiate terms
of employment.  For a CBA to meet the standards of the NLRB,
certain conditions and requirement must be met and discussed by
the parties in negotiations.  For most professional sports leagues,
the power of the commissioner, disciplinary measures, and griev-
ance procedures are mandatory parts of the collective bargaining
process.33
In discussing the CBAs of both the NFL and the NBA, several
similarities and differences prove illuminative in discussing how
each league approaches employee and management discipline.
1. Presence of Absence of Arbitrator
The first area is the presence, or absence, of an arbitrator.
Similar to the MLB, the CBA of the NBA allows for players to ap-
27. See id.
28. See id.; see also Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence,
supra note 4, at 1062–63; Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 167, 168–69 (1995).
29. Parlow, supra note 1, at 196 (quoting Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Sentencing
Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football League’s
Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 192 (2008)); see id.
at 196-202; Stiglitz, supra note 28, at 173.
30. Parlow, supra note 1, at 186 (quoting Gregor Lentze, Comment, The Legal
Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and an Alternative Approach
from A Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 72 (1995)); see id. at 185-89.
31. See id. at 196–202.
32. See Stiglitz, supra note 28, at 173–74.
33. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 196–202; see also Stiglitz, supra note 28, at
168–69.
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peal punishment and discipline to an outside arbitrator.34  The
NBA Players Association fought for such a system as an indication
that they believe in the idea that “commissioners are biased repre-
sentatives of management.”35  In contrast, the NFL does not have a
system in place for outside arbitrators to review and rule on com-
missioner-imposed discipline.  Indeed, NFL commissioner Roger
Goodell’s discipline may only be appealed to his office, and no fur-
ther.36  Discipline may be handed down by Goodell simply if he be-
lieves that the conduct in question is “detrimental to the integrity
of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”37
There has been some question of whether neutral arbitrators
are even essential or necessary in professional sports.  Some have
argued that arbitration passes best interests authority onto individu-
als, such as judges, who do not have the specialized knowledge and
insight to see what is best for a professional sports league.38  In-
deed, arbitrators have demonstrated a pattern of treating commis-
sioner disciplinary decisions, especially in the NBA, with less
deference than courts have.39  However, this critique is short-
sighted.  It is essential for any disciplinary program to have an over-
sight mechanism.  The NBA’s system must be considered today’s
gold standard, and allows for a healthy disciplinary structure to ex-
ist.  Without external review and oversight, in an industry as impor-
tant and lucrative as professional sports, there is simply a dearth of
integrity in the decisions of a league commissioner’s office.
If there is a lack of arbitration, it may well be because arbitra-
tors have recently shown little deference to commissioner discipline
that was handed down under the “best interests” clause of the oper-
ating agreement.  This is a wide departure from the historical legal
standard, in which judges have frequently upheld commissioner de-
cisions and shown wide deference to league commissioners, as long
as said commissioners have not made decisions that can be consid-
ered arbitrary and capricious.40
34. See Bethany P. Withers, Comment, The Integrity of the Game: Professional Ath-
letes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 163 (2010).
35. Pollack, supra note 5, at 1648; see id. at 1646–49.
36. See id. at 1646–49.
37. Id. at 1677 (quoting NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XI, sec.
1(a) (1993)); see id. at 1676-79.
38. See, e.g., id. at 1707.
39. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 195–96 (discussing case of former NBA star
Latrell Sprewell, whose suspension for choking coach was reduced by neutral arbi-
trator from 82 games to 68 games on basis of proportionality).
40. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1649.
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2. The Source of Commissioner Powers to Discipline
Second, it is instructive to look at where specifically, in their
respective sources, the commissioners of the NFL and the NBA de-
rive the bulk of their disciplinary power.
a. NBA Commissioner’s Power to Discipline
Article XXXI of the NBA CBA covers grievance and arbitration
procedures with respect to player discipline.41  Underneath this,
player discipline is divided into two categories: suspension of twelve
(12) games or less and suspension for more than twelve (12) games.
Each class of suspension can be for in-game conduct or for the
time-honored notion of “preserving the integrity of the game.”42
Concerning suspensions of fewer than twelve games, the suspension
“shall not give rise to a Grievance, shall not be a subject to a hearing
before . . . the Grievance Arbitrator, and shall not be determined by
arbitration.”43  The player suspended for fewer than twelve games
may appeal the ruling to the commissioner but this appeal will con-
stitute a final review of the dispute.
Section 9(b) of this article discusses player suspensions of more
than twelve games.  Under this section, a player or the union may
file a Grievance relative to the suspension.  Further, section 9(d)
provides the commissioner with substantial power to legislate pres-
ervation of the “integrity” of the game:
In the event a matter filed as a Grievance . . . gives rise to
issues involving the integrity of, or public confidence in,
the game of basketball . . . the Commissioner may, at any
stage of its processing, order the matter be withdrawn
from such processing and thereafter be processed in ac-
cordance with the appeal procedure provided . . . above.44
So, per the rules of the CBA, Adam Silver has full authority to disci-
pline and review any player suspended for twelve games and under,
while also having substantial powers to discipline for a suspension
of more than twelve games, powers that are subject to review by an
arbitrator.45  Of course, in practice, Silver’s disciplinary powers, for
both owners and players, exceed this grasp, as his actions during
41. 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 7, art. XXXI.
42. See Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disci-
plinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93, 103 (2014).
43. See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 7, art. XXXI, sec. 9(a).
44. Id. art. XXXI, sec. 9(d).
45. See Pacifici, supra note 42, at 103.
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the Donald Sterling scandal demonstrate.  Like many other com-
missioners, Silver has appeared to view the “integrity of the game”
clause as a mandate, and has acted accordingly.
b. NFL Commissioner’s Power to Discipline
In contrast to Silver, Commissioner Goodell derives the base of
his disciplinary power from the NFL constitution.  Article VIII of
the Constitution outlines Goodell’s ability to resolve disputes and to
take action against an individual affiliated with the NFL, when said
person “engages in conduct detrimental to the league.”46  With re-
gard to detrimental conduct, the commissioner has the power to:
[T]ake or adopt appropriate legal action . . . [which] he
deems necessary and proper in the best interest of . . . the
League or professional football, whenever any party . . .
employed by . . . connected with the League or any mem-
ber thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental either to
the League . . . or to professional football.47
As this appears to give Goodell wide range in determining disci-
pline,48 the CBA attempts to clarify this power.  Per Article 46 of the
NFL CBA:
[A]ll disputes involving a fine or suspension imposed
upon a player for conduct on the playing field . . . or in-
volving action taken against a player by the Commissioner
for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confi-
dence in, the game of professional football, will be
processed exclusively as follows: the Commissioner will
promptly send written notice of his action to the player . . .
[and within three days, the player] may appeal in writing
to the Commissioner.49
However, despite this further clarification, Goodell’s disciplinary
power has been criticized as ill-defined and “ambiguous.”50  Indeed,
Goodell has the broadest powers of discipline of any major sports
46. Id. at 103–04 (citing NFL CONST., supra note 8, art. VIII, at 28).
47. See NFL CONST., supra note 9, at art. VIII, sec. 8.6.
48. See Pacifici, supra note 42, at 104.
49. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 46, sec. 1 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter 2011 NFL CBA], available at https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/col-
lective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf.
50. See Pacifici, supra note 42, at 104.
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commissioner.51  Yet the NFL’s system has been derided as “the
worst system of the four [major sports leagues].”52
3. NBA & NFL Commissioner Authority Beyond CBA’s and
Constitutions
Finally, another key area of discipline underneath the um-
brella of the CBAs of both of these leagues relates to what discipli-
nary authority the commissioners have beyond their respective
CBAs and constitutions.  In the NBA, Adam Silver’s mechanism for
dealing with detrimental player conduct off the court is simple: the
standard NBA player contract contains a “good moral character”
clause.  It essentially allows a team to “terminate a player’s contract
if that player acts in a manner that is not consistent with the stan-
dards of good morals and citizenship.”53  In the past, NBA Commis-
sioners have cited this clause in handing down disciplinary
decisions for players.54  In fact, the combined mandate laid out by
the NBA CBA’s “best interests” clause and the “good morals” clause
in player contracts grant the NBA Commissioner “‘the broadest au-
thority’ among the commissioners of the major professional sports
leagues.”55
The NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy (“NFL PCP”) has, in the
past, given Goodell another source of authority in disciplining ath-
letes and other personnel, including owners.56  The NFL PCP man-
dates that “[a]ll persons associated with the NFL are required to
avoid ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity and public confidence
in the [NFL].’”57  Types of detrimental conduct include “sexual of-
fenses, domestic violence, crimes related to steroids or other
banned substances, dangerous activity that puts others’ safety at
risk, possessing a weapon in a workplace setting, and ‘conduct that
undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the
NFL.’”58  The document does include a proportionality require-
51. See Withers, supra note 34, at 168.
52. Pacifici, supra note 41, at 105.
53. Parlow, supra note 2, at 187 (citing Sean Bukowski, Note, Flag on the Play:
25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 110 (2001)); see id.
at 185–89.
54. See id. at 185–89.
55. Id. at 187 (quoting Brian D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Exces-
sive Use of Rule-Making Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 205, 212 (2007)).
56. See id. at 188-89 & nn.67–71 (citing, e.g., Marks, supra note 1, at 1584–85
(2008)).
57. Id. at 188 (first alteration in original) (quoting NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY 1 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 NFL PCP]).
58. Id. (quoting 2008 NFL PCP, supra note 57, at 1).
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ment, which allows some respite for players and personnel judged
to have violated the NFL PCP.  In late 2014, the NFL PCP was radi-
cally amended, with initial decisions on player and management
discipline being taken out of Goodell’s hands.59  New measures
adopted by this amendment to the NFL PCP include:
• “Additional NFL-funded counseling and services for vic-
tims, families, and violators”;
• “A more extensive list of prohibited conduct”;
• “Independent investigative procedures”;
• “Specific criteria for paid leave for an individual for-
mally charged with a crime of violence, including do-
mestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse”;
• “An expert group of outside advisors to review and eval-
uate potential violations and consult on other elements
of the policy”; and
• “A baseline suspension of six games without pay for vio-
lations involving assault, battery, domestic violence, dat-
ing violence, child abuse, other forms of family violence,
or sexual assault, with consideration given to possible
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.”60
Yet perhaps the most important portion of the amended NFL PCP
creates positions for disciplinary officers who will “oversee [NFL]
investigations and decide the discipline for violations of the pol-
icy.”61  The NFL recently hired Todd Jones, the former director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and Lisa
Friel, a former New York District Attorney, to fill the positions of
Special Counsel for Conduct and Special Counsel for Investiga-
tions, respectively.62  This change takes the initial disciplinary deci-
sion out of Goodell’s hands and adds another layer of disciplinary
59. See Ken Belson, N.F.L. Sets Strict Rules for Actions Off Field, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2014, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/sports/foot-
ball/roger-goodell-wont-assess-penalties-under-revised-conduct-policy.html?_r=0.
60. National Football League, NFL Owners Endorse New Personal Conduct Policy,
NFL.COM (Dec. 10, 2014, updated Dec. 19, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.nfl.com/
news/story/0ap3000000441758/printable/nfl-owners-endorse-new-personal-con-
duct-policy; see also NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (Dec.
2014) [hereinafter 2014 NFL PCP], available at http://static.nfl.com/static/con-
tent/public/photo/2014/12/10/0ap3000000441637.pdf.
61. Joe Calabrese, NFL Personal Conduct Policy: What the League Changed, HEAVY
(Dec. 10, 2014, 5:46 PM), http://heavy.com/sports/2014/12/nfl-owners-vote-per-
sonal-conduct-policy-changes-roger-goodell/ (quoting Roger Goodell’s comments
on policy change).
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procedures to the NFL’s apparatus.  This change has already faced
harsh criticism for disregarding Fifth Amendment protections.63
Creating an office to standardize investigations and participate in
the adjudication of punishments may provide a tier of “procedural
due process” for those facing NFL punishment.  However, many
view this as solely a public relations move as Goodell maintains his
power as the ultimate adjudicator and arbitrator of punishment ap-
peals unless he unilaterally decides to appoint a neutral arbitra-
tor.64  Future disciplinary proceedings should be analyzed for
effects and limitations in implementing the new NFL conduct pol-
icy and disciplinary process.
C. Commissioner Power to Discipline Owners
For the NBA, the power to discipline owners is derived from
the “best interest clause” in the NBA Constitution and bylaws.65
The NBA Constitution was only recently made public following the
discipline of Donald Sterling, so previously the public assumed that
the NBA Commissioner’s authority was embedded into his office’s
inherent power.66  Specifically, the NBA Constitution empowers the
Commissioner with the ability to suspend,67 and fine owners.68  In
63. See Mike Florio, New Personal Conduct Policy Disregards Fifth Amendment Pro-
tections, NBC SPORTS (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports
.com/2014/12/10/new-personal-conduct-policy-disregards-fifth-amendment-pro-
tections/.
64. See, e.g., Erik Matuszewski, NFL Union Demands Independent Arbitrator for Pe-
terson Appeal, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2014, updated Nov. 21, 2014, 12:23 AM), http:/
/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-20/nfl-union-demands-arbitrator-
over-goodell-for-peterson-appeal; Lindsay H. Jones, NFL Names Former U.S. Judge As
Arbitrator for Ray Rice Appeal, USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/ravens/2014/10/02/nfl-names-former-us-judge-
as-arbitrator-for-ray-rice-appeal/16588557/.
65. See generally NBA CONST., supra note 8.
66. See Barry Petchesky, That ‘Secret’ NBA Constitution is Now Online, DEADSPIN
(Apr. 29, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://deadspin.com/that-secret-nba-constitution-is-
now-online-1569509012.
67. See NBA CONST., supra note 65, art. 24(i).  Article 24(i) reads:
The Commissioner shall have the power to suspend a Player, Coach,
Member, Owner, or other person subject to the Commissioner’s jurisdic-
tion for a definite or indefinite period and to impose such fines and
other penalties as are authorized by Article 35, 35A or any other Article
or Section relating thereto of this Constitution and By-Laws. . . .
Id.
68. See id. art. 24(l).  Article 24(l) reads:
The Commissioner shall, wherever there is a rule for which no penalty is
specifically fixed for violation thereof, have the authority to fix such pen-
alty as in the Commissioner’s judgment shall be in the best interests of
the Association. Where a situation arise which is not covered in the Con-
stitution and By-Laws, the Commissioner shall have the authority to make
such decision, including the imposition of a penalty, as in his judgment
16
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the NBA Constitution’s current state, Article 24(l) also includes a
“best interests of the Association” clause that essentially gives Silver
the power to levy any punishment he sees fit when a violation is not
specifically covered elsewhere.69 During the tenure of David Stern,
the power of the commissioner was expanded most likely using the
“best interest clause” for off-the-court behavior, including behavior
of owners.70  Through the best interest power, Stern also regulated
comments critical of the referees by fining Mark Cuban, the cur-
rent owner of the Dallas Mavericks.71  The rise of the NFL commis-
sioner’s power to discipline owners occurred during the Rozelle
era.  In 1988, the owners amended the NFL Constitution granting
the commissioner “full, complete, and final jurisdiction and author-
ity [over] any dispute involving a member or members in the
League.”72  The current NFL Constitution’s Article 8 empowers the
NFL commissioner to discipline, including fine or suspend, “an
owner, shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a member
club . . . [who] has [ ] violated the Constitution and Bylaws of the
League.”73
Both the NBA and NFL have comprehensive processes and
structures in place to deal with management and employee disci-
pline.  For leagues that generate billions of dollars in revenue each
year and have incredible media exposure, it is imperative that they
have such systems in place to deal with important disciplinary mat-
ters.74  An overview of these systems reveals how player and owner
discipline are treated, with owner discipline primarily provided for
through each leagues’ constitutions and player discipline nominally
handled through the CBAs.  In 2014, both leagues were tested by
unprecedented personnel scandals, which rocked the entire sports
landscape.  These scandals, detailed below, have not only tested
shall be in the best interests of the Association. The penalty that may be
assessed under the preceding two sentences may include, without limita-
tion, a fine, suspension, and/or the forfeiture or assignment of draft




70. See Jeremy R. Abrams, Comment, Making the Right Call: Why Fairness Re-
quires Independent Appeals in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 469,
489 (2013).
71. See id. at 490; Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the
NBA Commissioner, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 59–60 (2010).
72. Ambrose, supra note 10, at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Pollack,
supra note 5, at 1677, citing NFL CONST § 8.3 (1988)).
73. NFL CONST., supra note 47, art. VIII, sec. 8.13(A).
74. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1646–49.
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commissioners Goodell and Silver, but also brought the prospect of
a changing paradigm in sports discipline.
III. DISCIPLINE IN THE NBA AND NFL IN 2014
2014 was an unprecedented year in employee and manage-
ment discipline in the NFL and NBA.  It was not only the number
of stories that made the headlines, but also the parties involved.  In
the NFL, some of the league’s brightest stars found their careers
and livelihoods derailed by heinous personal incidents.  While in
the NBA, two teams changed ownership as a result of personal scan-
dals involving their owner and his backwards views on race.  The
most illustrative examples help contextualize what changes this area
has experienced.
A. Examples of Owner and Management Discipline
1. Donald Sterling (NBA)
For decades, Donald Sterling, the former owner of the NBA’s
Los Angeles Clippers, was held up as an example of perhaps the
worst ownership situation in sports.75  Sterling, who made his for-
tune in California real estate, had long faced allegations of discrimi-
nation and racism, including several lawsuits relating to unfair
housing practices against minorities.76  On the court, Sterling was
notorious for always eyeing the bottom line, making inappropriate
comments about his players, and doing little to stop the team’s slide
into obscurity and irrelevance.77  In April 2014, the allegations and
conjecture bubbled over the top as tabloid website TMZ.com re-
leased audio recordings of Sterling in a heated argument with his
mistress, V. Stiviano.78  The tapes, recorded covertly by Stiviano as
part of an effort to get revenge on Sterling for some of his actions,
showed Sterling making derogatory and racist comments about
blacks and other minorities, including LA Lakers legend Magic
75. See Tom Ziller, The NBA is Full of Horrible Owners, SB NATION (Sept. 10,
2012, 9:46 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/2012/9/10/3307403/nba-worst-own-
ers-maloofs-james-dolan-donald-sterling-hook.
76. See Scott Glover, Donald Sterling to Pay $2.725 Million to Settle Housing Dis-
crimination Lawsuit, L.A. NOW (Nov. 3, 2009, 9:54 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes
.com/lanow/2009/11/donald-sterling-to-pay-2725-million-to-settle-housing-dis-
crimination-lawsuit.html.
77. See Billy Witz, Vortex of Outrage Trails Clippers’ Owner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2014, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/sports/basketball/
clippers-owner-donald-sterling-has-public-record-of-bad-behavior.html?_r=0.
78. See Nathan Fenno, A Timeline on the Donald Sterling Saga, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/clippers/la-sp-clippers-sale-
timeline-20140530-story.html#page=1.
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Johnson.79  Sterling was widely excoriated in the media and general
public.80  As the firestorm grew, sponsors began to drop the Clip-
pers and Sterling’s own players, including NBA All-Stars Chris Paul
and Blake Griffin, began staging public protests against his contin-
ued ownership.81  On April 29, 2014, a mere four days after these
videos became public, commissioner Silver took action: banning
Sterling for life, fining him $2.5 million, and working in collusion
with the NBA Board of Governors to remove him of his majority
ownership stake.82  Despite threats of litigation and public refusals
to sell the team, Sterling passed his ownership stake to former
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer in late May 2014 after the NBA’s
Board of Governors voted to approve the sale.83  Sterling remains
banned from the NBA.84
2. Danny Ferry (NBA)
Danny Ferry took an indefinite leave of absence after making
racially insensitive comments about veteran Miami Heat forward
Luol Deng in June, less than two months after NBA commissioner
Adam Silver banned Donald Sterling for life.85  In a conference call
with ownership on June 6, 2014, Ferry said the following:
The rap on him is little bit, um, body is not as torn up as
you think, um, although he’s played a lot of minutes.  If
you managed it the right way he’ll be fine.  He’s still a
young guy overall, um, but he is also, he is a good guy
79. See Jason Hanna, Donald Sterling Purportedly Says Jealousy Behind Racist Com-
ments, CNN (May 12, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/09/us/nba-donald-
sterling-audio-recording/.
80. See Kevin Spain, Donald Sterling Drawing Big-Name Criticism Around NBA,
USA TODAY (April 27, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
nba/clippers/2014/04/27/nba-donald-sterling-michael-jordan-magic-johnson-ke-
vin-johnson-adam-silver/8291203/.
81. See Sponsors End Clippers Sponsorship, ESPN (Apr. 28, 2014, 6:19 PM), http:/
/espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/10851689/sponsors-ponder-deals-los-
angeles-clippers-donald-sterling-purported-racist-comments; Arash Markazi, Clip-
pers Stage Silent Protest, ESPN L.A. (Apr. 28, 2014, 1:02 PM), http://espn.go.com/
los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/10848577/los-angeles-clippers-stage-silent-protest-
donald-sterling-hide-team-logo.
82. See Fenno, supra note 79.
83. See id.
84. See Donald Sterling Adds Wife to Lawsuit Against NBA, USA TODAY (Mar. 11,
2015, 6:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2015/03/11/don-
ald-sterling-adds-wife-lawsuit-against-nba/70171256/.
85. See Danny Ferry Takes Leave of Absence, ESPN (Sept. 13, 2014), http://
espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/11514254/danny-ferry-atlanta-hawks-takes-leave-ab-
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overall but he’s not perfect.  He’s got some African in him.
And I don’t say that in a bad way other than he is a guy
who will do something behind you.  He has a store front
out front that’s beautiful and great, but he may be selling
some counterfeit stuff behind you.  And when I say that, I
mean for example he can come out and be an unnamed
source for a story, and two days later come out and say that
was absolutely not me, I can’t believe someone said that.86
Ferry has claimed he was “repeating” comments he heard and that
the comments did not reflect his personal beliefs.87  After a three-
month investigation of Danny Ferry, the team disciplined him with
undisclosed actions.  The Ferry incident is an interesting juxtaposi-
tion because of the inaction of the NBA head office.  In comments
regarding the Ferry conference call, Adam Silver explained, “The
discipline of a team employee is typically determined by the team,
and in this case the Hawks hired a . . . law firm to investigate the
circumstances of Danny Ferry’s clearly inappropriate and unaccept-
able remarks.  In my view, those comments, taken alone, do not
merit his losing his job.”88  Notably, the Danny Ferry story led to the
emergence of the 2012 email written by then-Atlanta Hawks owner,
Bruce Levenson.
3. Bruce Levenson (NBA)
One of Sterling’s biggest critics during his scandal was Leven-
son, still the co-owner of the NBA’s Atlanta Hawks.89  Levenson,
who made his fortune in communications, became the Hawks co-
owner in 2004 after the sale of the team by Time Warner.90  In Sep-
tember 2014, Levenson self-reported to the NBA that he was re-
signing as team owner and selling his interest.91  The reason behind
86. Audio Tape of Hawks Conference Call, AJC.COM (Sept. 11, 2014, 9:33 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/weblogs/atlanta-hawks/2014/sep/11/exclusive-audio-tape-
hawks-conference-call/ (providing audio recording of Ferry’s conference call).
87. See Haberstroh, supra note 87.
88. Adam Silver: Not Fireable Offense, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2014), http://espn.go
.com/nba/story/_/id/11504904/commissioner-adam-silver-believe-atlanta-hawks-
gm-danny-ferry-fired-luol-deng-comments (quoting Adam Silver’s comments in
USA Today interview).
89. See Cindy Boren, The Difference Between Bruce Levenson and Donald Sterling,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/
wp/2014/09/08/the-difference-between-bruce-levenson-and-donald-sterling/.
90. See Lauren Raab, Hawks Owner Bruce Levenson to Sell Team, Apologizes for
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this sudden admission was a racist 2012 email that Levenson sent to
Hawks president Danny Ferry.92  The email, described by Levenson
himself as “inappropriate” and “offensive,” included Levenson’s be-
lief that the Hawks fan base was too heavily African-American and
that this was a problem for the team as it “scared away” white fans.93
Levenson’s prompt departure was stunning and was undoubtedly
colored by the NBA’s decision on Sterling just a couple of months
before.94  Public reaction was mixed, as some praised Levenson’s
decision to self-report, while others wondered what precedent this
would set.95  “As Mr. Levenson acknowledged, the views he ex-
pressed are entirely unacceptable and are in stark contrast to the
core principles of the National Basketball Association,” said Adam
Silver in a press release.  “He shared with me how truly remorseful
he is for using those hurtful words and how apologetic he is to the
entire NBA family—fans, players, team employees, business part-
ners and fellow team owners—for having diverted attention away
from our game.”96  On June 24th, 2015, Levenson sold the Hawks
to an ownership group headed by businessman Tony Ressler and
former NBA star Grant Hill.97  The ripples of his admission, and
quick resignation, are still spreading around the league.
4. Jim Irsay (NFL)
On March 16, 2014 in Carmel, Indiana, Indianapolis Colts
owner Jim Irsay was arrested and initially charged with operating a
vehicle while intoxicated and four counts of possession of a con-
trolled substance.98  Blood tests revealed ”oxycodone and/or
92. See id.
93. See Ben Cohen & Chris Herring, Atlanta Hawks Owner to Sell After ‘Offensive’
Email, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 7, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/atlanta-
hawks-owner-to-sell-in-wake-of-offensive-email-1410107014.
94. See Boren, supra note 91.
95. See Chris Mannix, What’s Bruce Levenson’s Real Motivation for Selling the
Hawks?, SPORTS ILLUS. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.si.com/nba/2014/09/08/
bruce-levenson-racist-email-atlanta-hawks-sale; see also Fans React to Bruce Levenson’s
Email, AJC.COM (Sept. 10. 2014), http://www.ajc.com/videos/news/fans-react-to-
bruce-levensons-email/vCrbZS/ (video) (Berndt Peterson reporting).
96. Adi Joseph, Bruce Levenson Will Sell Atlanta Hawks After Releasing Racist E-
mail, USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:38 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nba/hawks/2014/09/07/bruce-levenson-racist-email-atlanta-owner-sell-
team/15241591/ (quoting Adam Silver’s comments in NBA news release).
97. See Des Bieler, Hawks Officially Sold to Ownership Group That Includes Grant
Hill, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2015/06/25/hawks-officially-sold-to-ownership-group-that-includes-
grant-hill/.
98. See Jeff Gray, Jim Irsay Suspended 6 Games, Fined, Banned from Tweeting About
NFL, SB NATION (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/9/2/58660
29/jim-irsay-colts-owner-suspension; Gregg Rosenthal, Colts’ Jim Irsay Suspended Six
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hydrocodone” in his system after police pulled him over for travel-
ing 10 mph in a 35 mph zone.99  In addition to bottles of prescrip-
tion drugs, police found nearly $30,000 in cash in Irsay’s car,
$12,000 of which was bundled into a laundry bag.100  On Tuesday,
September 2, 2014, Irsay pled guilty to a misdemeanor count of
driving while intoxicated.101  The NFL suspended Irsay for six
games and fined him $500,000 for violating the league’s Personal
Conduct Policy.102
B. Examples of Player Discipline
For the NFL and the NBA, 2014 was also a year of scandals and
discipline involving some of their biggest and most promising play-
ers.  A cursory overview of three of the biggest player disciplinary
stories from both leagues, two from the NFL and one from the
NBA, would also be instructive.  It is no surprise that 2014 was a
pivotal year of discipline for off-field incidents in the NFL.  As early
as 2000, the NFL acknowledged that criminal behavior of players
off the field was an important and crucial area of reform.103  The
discipline of Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson were major cases from
2014.
1. Ray Rice (NFL)
Perhaps the most prominent story from the world of sports dis-
cipline in 2014 was the tale of Ray Rice, former Pro Bowl running
back for the NFL’s Baltimore Ravens.  Rice, a centerpiece of the
Ravens team, was known as one of the most generous and charita-
ble NFL players and was highly involved in community efforts in
and around the greater Baltimore area.104  In the early morning
hours of February 15, 2014, Rice was involved in an altercation with
his then-fiance´e, Janay Palmer, in an Atlantic City casino eleva-
Games, Fined $500K, NFL.COM (Sept. 2, 2014, updated Sept. 3, 2014, 11:05 AM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000387267/article/colts-jim-irsay-sus-
pended-six-games-fined-500k.




103. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 182–83.
104. See Baltimore Ravens, Ray Rice Makes Impact in Youth Community, BAL-
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tor.105  Both were arrested and charged with assault.106  Four days
after the incident, TMZ released video of Rice dragging the uncon-
scious Palmer out of the elevator.107  The video went viral and
prompted a national conversation over its veracity and the truth
behind the situation.108  In March, a grand jury indicted Rice on a
charge of third-degree aggravated assault.109  Rice pled not guilty
and entered a program for first-time offenders that can clear him of
the charges in one year.110  Soon after, Rice, Palmer, and the Ra-
vens hosted a news conference that was widely mocked and criti-
cized.111  On July 24, after meeting with Rice and Palmer, Goodell
announced a two game suspension for Rice, beginning August
30.112
A month later, on August 28, the NFL rolled out a new, har-
sher domestic violence policy, under which first time offenders
would be suspended for six games and repeat offenders would be
banned for life.113  On September 8, TMZ released a second video
of footage from inside the elevator, which shows Rice punching
Palmer in the face.114  The second video unleashed a firestorm of
public criticism and, hours after the video was released, the Ravens
terminated Rice’s contract and the NFL suspended Rice indefi-
nitely.115  After issuing the suspension, Goodell claimed to not have
seen this second video until its release by TMZ, an admission that
still drew heavy skepticism by many in the public and media.116




108. See SI Wire, NFL Players, Media Members React to New Ray Rice Video on Twit-
ter, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.si.com/nfl/2014/09/08/ray-
rice-suspension-twitter-reaction.
109. See D’Arcy Maine, A Timeline of the NFL’s and Ravens’ Reactions to Ray Rice





113. See Josh Levs, NFL Toughens Policy Addressing Assault and Domestic Violence,
CNN (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/us/nfl-con-
duct/.
114. See Ray Rice Elevator Knockout: Fiancee Takes Crushing Punch (Video), TMZ
SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.tmz.com/2014/09/08/ray-rice-eleva-
tor-knockout-fiancee-takes-crushing-punch-video/.
115. See Ray Rice Cut, Then Suspended by NFL, ESPN (Sept. 9, 2014), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11489134/baltimore-ravens-cut-ray-rice-new-video-
surfaces.
116. See CBS This Morning, Roger Goodell: We didn’t see full Ray Rice video, CB-
SNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ray-rice-controversy-
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Many called for Goodell to be fired or to resign.117  Following an
independent investigation conducted by former FBI director Rob-
ert Mueller, Goodell and the league were found to have acted in
good faith, but were similarly admonished for their incomplete,
shoddy work in conducting the investigation.118  In late November
2014, Rice won his appeal of the indefinite suspension and was rein-
stated to the NFL.119  Goodell’s decision to extend Rice’s suspen-
sion was characterized by the arbitrator as “an abuse of discretion”
and was accordingly vacated.120  As of the third week of the free
agent signing period, Rice remained unsigned by any NFL team.121
2. Adrian Peterson (NFL)
Later in 2014, on the heels of the Ray Rice debacle, another
scandal shook the promising career of another star NFL running
back.  Adrian Peterson, former Minnesota Vikings All-Pro running
back and league rushing champion, saw his 2014-2015 season pre-
maturely end after allegations of child abuse were levied through
the media.  On May 18, a police report was made public that de-
tailed injuries incurred by one of Peterson’s young sons, allegedly
resulting from Peterson’s use of a whipping switch.122  The media
frenzy surrounding the report cast a spotlight onto the situation
and sparked a national conversation on the effects of child disci-
pline.123  A month later, Peterson testified in front of a grand jury
commissioner-roger-goodell-defends-nfl-says-league-didnt-see-second-video/ (tran-
scribing interview with NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell).
117. See, e.g., NOW Wants Roger Goodell Out, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2014), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11500445/terry-oneill-president-national-organiza-
tion-women-calls-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-resign; Maury Brown, It’s Time for
Roger Goodell to Resign as Commissioner of the NFL, FORBES (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:01 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2014/09/10/its-time-for-roger-good-
ell-to-resign-as-commissioner-of-the-nfl/.
118. See ROBERT S. MUELLER III, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE RAY RICE INCIDENT (Jan. 8, 2015),
available at, http://i.usatoday.net/sports/nfl/2015-01-07-Mueller-Report.pdf.
119. See Ray Rice, NFL Arbitration (2014) (Jones, Arb.), available at http://
espn.go.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf; see also Ray Rice Wins Ap-
peal, Eligible to Sign, ESPN (Dec. 1, 2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/
11949855/ray-rice-baltimore-ravens-wins-appeal-eligible-reinstatement.
120. See Ray Rice Wins Appeal, Eligible to Sign, supra note 119.
121. See Gary Myers, With QBs Drew Brees and Philip Rivers Possibly in Mix, Jets
Could Make Moves, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/
sports/football/jets/myers-brees-rivers-possibly-mix-jets-article-1.2157881.
122. See Steve DiMatteo, A Timeline of the Adrian Peterson Child Abuse Case, SB
NATION (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/9/17/6334793/adrian-
peterson-child-abuse-statement-vikings-timeline.
123. See, e.g., Gregg Doyel, Adrian Peterson Starts National Dialogue on Discipline
and Child Abuse, CBSSPORTS.COM (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/gen-
eral/writer/gregg-doyel/24715929/adrian-peterson-starts-national-dialogue-on-
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in Montgomery County, Texas.124  Two weeks after that, the grand
jury decided not to indict Peterson.125  However, eight days later on
September 12, in the aftermath of a thorough investigation,126 Pe-
terson was indicted on charges of reckless or negligent injury to a
child.127  The Vikings promptly deactivated Peterson, who up to
that point had played in only one game for the franchise in the new
season.128  The outcry over the situation was not just limited to the
public, with several sponsors, like Radisson and Anheuser-Busch,
expressing their concerns or even pulling their endorsement deals
with the franchise and the NFL.129  On Wednesday, September 17,
2014, the Vikings placed Peterson on the NFL’s exempt/commis-
sioner’s permission list, essentially ending his season.130  Despite
seeking an accelerated trial and eventually avoiding jail time on the
charge after reaching a plea agreement with prosecutors, Peterson
remained suspended for the entire season.131  In late 2014, the NFL
Players Association filed a lawsuit against the NFL on Peterson’s be-
half after his suspension stretched throughout the entire season.132
It was only in late February 2015 that Peterson was reinstated to the
NFL, thanks to a favorable ruling by U.S. District Court Judge David
Doty.133  In the lawsuit, the players union had argued that Goodell
acted outside of his authority by suspending Peterson for such a
substantial amount of time.134  The ruling was characterized as the
discipline-and-child-abuse; Gary Washburn, Adrian Peterson’s Actions Reflective of Cul-
tural Differences, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
sports/2014/09/22/adrian-peterson-actions-reflective-cultural-differences/oFW7
d6LtQ8QziVJfJilhDL/story.html.
124. See DiMatteo, supra note 122.
125. See id.
126. See Jeff Gray, Adrian Peterson Indicted for Reckless or Negligent Injury to Child,
Per Report, SB NATION (Sept. 12, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/
2014/9/12/6141819/adrian-peterson-arrest-child-injury-houston/in/5906378.
127. See DiMatteo, supra note 122.
128. See id.
129. See Press Release, Carlson, Radisson Statement on the Minnesota Vikings
(Sept. 15, 2014), available at http://carlson.com/news-and-media/news-re-
leases.do?article=8660785&hootPostID=511dee2099ba9fec719bdc180dd01324;
Darren Rovell, Nike Ends Deal with Adrian Peterson, ESPN (Nov. 7, 2014), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11832526/nike-terminates-contract-minnesota-vik-
ings-running-back-adrian-peterson.
130. See DiMatteo, supra note 122.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 88 F.
Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015).
134. See NFL Players Union Files Lawsuit Challenging Peterson Suspension, 26 NO.
12 WESTLAW J. ENT. INDUS. 11 (2015) (citing Complaint for Petitioner, Nat’l Foot-
ball League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League et al., No. 14-mc-0075 (D. Minn.
filed Dec. 15, 2014)) (“Filed at the U.S. District Court in Minneapolis, the lawsuit
25
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“latest blow to the NFL and commissioner Roger Goodell.”135  At
the third week of the free agent signing period, Peterson still re-
mains a member of the Vikings and completed a successful 2015-16
season.136
3. Larry Sanders (NBA)
Although it was generally a quieter year in the NBA vis-a`-vis
player discipline than its football counterpart, the saga with Larry
Sanders stood out amongst the player discipline stories that made
the headlines.  Sanders, a fifth year player for the Milwaukee Bucks,
was one of the rising stars in the league and had just signed a four-
year, $44 million contract in 2013.137  However, on April 4, 2014,
Sanders was issued a five-game suspension by the league office for
violating the NBA’s drug policy after a positive marijuana test.138
Several months later, during the 2014–15 season, Sanders was again
suspended, this time for ten games, for another drug policy viola-
tion.139  The suspension was open-ended in nature, reportedly due
to Sanders’ continued non-compliance with the league program.140
For years, there have been stories concerning Sanders drug abuse
and his struggles with the mental aspects of playing in the NBA.141
In late February 2015, Milwaukee waived Sanders, citing that doing
so was “in the best interests of the team.”142  After negotiating a
claims arbitrator Harold Henderson, a former NFL executive handpicked by Com-
missioner Roger Goodell to hear the case, was not impartial.”).
135. See Vikings Running Back Adrian Peterson Reinstated, ESPN (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/adrian-peterson-reinstated/story?id=29247428.
136. See Kevin Seifert, Zimmer: ‘Expect’ Peterson with Vikes, ESPN (Mar. 25, 2015,
2:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12555918/adrian-peterson-trade-
not-minnesota-vikings-plans-mike-zimmer-says.
137. See Larry Sanders, Why I Walked Away from the NBA, THE PLAYERS TRIBUNE
(Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.theplayerstribune.com/larry-sanders-exclusive-inter-
view/.
138. See Rob Mahoney, Bucks’ Larry Sanders Suspended Five Games for Violation of
NBA’s Anti-Drug Program, SPORTS ILLUS. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.si.com/nba/
point-forward/2014/04/04/larry-sanders-milwaukee-bucks-suspended-drug-
program.





142. Bucks Request Waivers on Larry Sanders, NBA.COM (Feb. 21, 2015), http://
www.nba.com/2015/news/02/21/bucks-waive-larry-sanders-official-release/.
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buyout with the Bucks that paid him part of his original salary,
Sanders has yet to sign with any team and remains a free agent.143
C. Comparing Management Discipline and Player Discipline
in the NFL & NBA
1. The NFL Approach
The examples summarized above capture the current state of
the NFL commissioner’s power to discipline players and coaches.
NFL commissioner Roger Goodell reiterated the reach of the
league’s personal conduct story in his letter to Irsay.  Excerpted in
the league’s official announcement: “I have stated on numerous oc-
casions that owners, management personnel and coaches must be
held to a higher standard than players.  We discussed this during
our meeting and you expressed your support for that view, volun-
teering that owners should be held to the highest standard.”144
The disciplinary actions taken in 2014 reveal that Roger Good-
ell has continued to liberally utilize his power as commissioner just
as he did when initially elected.145  Known colloquially as Commis-
sioner “Gotti,” comparing the way he has managed the NFL with
the former mob boss John Gotti,146 Goodell punished off-the-field
behavior for eight years under the 2007 PCP.147  In 2014, under the
2007 PCP, Goodell was the everyday disciplinarian for NFL players
while also being able to incorporate ad hoc modifications to the
policy, such as adding a violation of the domestic violence stat-
ute.148  With his understanding of the power of public perception,
143. See Larry Sanders, Bucks Finalize Buyout, ESPN (Feb. 22, 2015), http://
espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/12361951/milwaukee-bucks-officially-waive-larry-
sanders-completing-buyout.
144. Jim Irsay Suspended for Six Games for Violating NFL Personal Conduct Policy,
HUFFPOST SPORTS (Sept. 2, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/09/02/jim-irsay-suspended-nfl_n_5754292.html (quoting letter from Roger
Goodell to Jim Irsay).
145. See Ambrose, supra note 7, at 1088 (documenting “the protection of the
NFL’s wealth and image quickly as one of Goodell’s top priorities, especially since
player off-the-field misconduct plagued his first year as commissioner”).
146. See Kimberly A. Colmey, Unnecessary Roughness: Why the NFL Should Not Be
Flagged for Antitrust Scrutiny in Labor Relations, 5 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231, 265
(2011).
147. See NFL Personal Conduct Policy, ESPN (Mar. 2, 2009), http://sports.espn
.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2798214, ESPN; see also NFL Owners Endorse New Per-
sonal Conduct Policy, supra note 60.
148. See Peter King, Peterson’s Punishment, THE MONDAY MORNING
QUARTERBACK (Nov. 18, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/11/18/adrian-peter-
son-suspension-appeal-roger-goodell/.
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Goodell looked to mold his workforce “so they [the players] play
the game the way he [Goodell] wants it played.”149
Goodell was criticized for using a double standard when pun-
ishing players and team owners, something NFL Players Association
executive director DeMaurice Smith has called a “credibility
gap.”150  “What troubles our players is the speed and the deliberate-
ness of the punishment that they have seen in the past when it
comes to a player,” Smith said in late May of 2014.151  Players
around the league also questioned whether there was a double stan-
dard for Goodell’s rulings on punishments for owners as opposed
to players.152  One former Colts player noted how Irsay was fined
only $500,000 while Denver Broncos receiver Wes Welker lost $1.8
million while serving his four-game suspension for breaking the
league’s policy on performance-enhancing drugs.153  Players have
also noted that the league waited months to discipline Irsay.154  The
new PCP responds to some of these concerns and others, such as
the lack of transparency and inconsistent punishments.155
As the new PCP transforms the process and procedures of
player discipline and heavily constrains the commissioner’s discipli-
nary authority, many individual NFL teams have responded by tak-
ing a tougher approach to player discipline.  Coupling the Ray Rice
domestic violence incident and the arrests of eight player between
February 2014 to March 2015, the Ravens instituted a strict no-toler-
ance policy this off-season for player behavior.156  In the first two
months following the Super Bowl, the Baltimore Ravens cut three
149. Danny O’Neil, Commissioner Goodell Should Pull Back a Bit from Heavy-
handed Punishments, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012, 9:21 PM), http://www.seattle-
times.com/sports/seahawks/commissioner-goodell-should-pull-back-a-bit-from-
heavy-handed-punishments/.
150. See Goodell: Don’t Rush to Judgment, ESPN (June 3, 2014), http://espn.go
.com/nfl/story/_/id/11002392/demaurice-smith-nfl-players-association-critical-
commissioner-roger-goodell.
151. Id. (quoting statement by DeMaurice Smith); see also, Jeff Gray, Jim Irsay
Suspended 6 Games, Fined, Banned from Tweeting about NFL, supra note 100.
152. See Mike Wells, NFL Players Rip Jim Irsay Punishment, ABCNEWS.COM (Sept.
3, 2014, 6:27 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/nfl-players-rip-jim-irsay-punish-
ment/story?id=25238565.
153. See id.
154. See Jonathan Lehman, NFL Players See Double Standard in Long Wait for
Irsay Punishment, N.Y. POST (May 29, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/05/
29/nfl-players-see-double-standard-in-long-wait-for-irsay-punishment/.
155. See Mike Triplett, Drew Brees: System Not Transparent, ESPN (Sept. 25,
2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11583698/drew-brees-new-orleans-
saints-critical-commissioner-roger-goodell.
156. See Greg A. Bedard, Baltimore’s Big Problem, THE MONDAY MORNING
QUARTERBACK (Mar. 20, 2015), http://mmqb.si.com/2015/03/20/baltimore-ra-
vens-player-arrests-problem-nfl/.
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players, including running back Bernard Pierce for a DUI arrest,
Terrence Cody for a felony animal cruelty charge and misde-
meanor drug charges, and cornerback Victor Hampton for a DUI
arrest.157  This corrective mechanism that the Ravens are instituting
to change their team culture illuminates a critical view of the NFL
that creates flexibility in their disciplinary procedures – almost
none of the NFL player contracts are guaranteed.158  The ability of
teams to cut players at will provides considerable flexibility for
teams to circumvent the NFL commissioner’s office, even after pro-
cedural thresholds were added to the PCP because those thresholds
do not apply to team-specific off-season discipline.  As Goodell’s
power in this area continues to erode, NFL teams can continue to
use this secondary and non-legitimate disciplinary process to react
to public scrutiny of player behavior.
2. The NBA Approach
The NBA and Adam Silver have taken a slightly different ap-
proach to player discipline.  Whereas, over the past year, Goodell
has made headlines for embarrassing player discipline scandals, Sil-
ver has made waves by using his “integrity of the game” mandate to
clean up the image of basketball and stamp out any perceived im-
propriety that may threaten the league.159  What has been most
transformative about Silver’s actions is the breadth of his approach.
He has not only tackled thorny player disciplinary issues but also
brought his mandate to bear upon owners, such as Sterling.160  A
sports commissioner’s power under the “best interests” or “integrity
of the game” clause has always been interpreted and upheld quite
broadly.161  However, Silver has made new inroads into sports disci-
pline and has taken a hard stand by extending the reach of this
power to NBA ownership, the very group to whom he answers.162
157. See id.
158. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 1236 (“In the NFL, the vast majority of
players have limited job security because most NFL contracts are not guaranteed
and do not contain injury protection beyond the season in which the injury
occurs.”).
159. See Ben Golliver, Commissioner Adam Silver Discusses Potential Reforms at All-
Star Saturday, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.si.com/nba/2015/
02/14/adam-silver-press-conference-nba-commissioner.
160. See Lee Jenkins, New Commissioner Adam Silver is His Own Man, SPORTS
ILLUS. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.si.com/nba/2014/05/20/adam-silver-nba-
commissioner-donald-sterling.
161. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1645.
162. See Tom Van Riper, Adam Silver Drops the Hammer on Donald Sterling,
FORBES (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/
2014/04/29/adam-silver-drops-the-hammer-on-donald-sterling/; see also Ian
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Yet while Silver’s power appears to be expanding, the NBA has
several checks in place to create a balanced disciplinary system.
Chief among these is the requirement of an outside arbitrator to
review commissioner suspensions that last longer than twelve
days.163  As previously discussed, outside arbitrators have, histori-
cally, been more critical of commissioner power and decisions than
the courts.164  The presence of this additional layer of review is criti-
cal to the process.  Second, it appears that league discipline has
been well-balanced by the discipline meted out by the individual
teams, both in terms of management and players.165  A primary ex-
ample of this is the case of Danny Ferry, the aforementioned At-
lanta Hawks General Manager who was censored for racist
comments he made in the course of player management discus-
sions.166  Ferry was censored primarily by the Hawks and took a vol-
untary leave of absence.167  While league discipline was surely likely
in the Ferry case before the self-imposed sanctions, NBA teams have
also been quick to deal with such problems in-house, a policy that
Silver has respected.168
There is one final balancing piece that completes the NBA dis-
cipline puzzle.  Over the past several years, the NBA has found a
strong counterpart in the form of the NBA Players’ Association
(“NBPA”).  Currently led by Michele Roberts, the NBPA has taken
several bold strides in the past several years, both in the media and
in practice.169  These include directly attacking several NBA policies
in the media and taking a stand on controversial league issues, such
Begley, Adam Silver: NBA to Review Policies, ESPN (Sept. 22, 2014, 7:11 PM), http://
espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/11570243/adam-silver-says-nba-evaluate-discipli-
nary-policies.
163. See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 9, at 378.
164. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 195–96.
165. See Gary Lane, NBA’s Ban on Donald Sterling Draws Widespread Praise, CBN
NEWS (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2014/April/NBA-to-An-
nounce-Decision-on-Clippers-Don-Sterling/ (discussing praise NBA, and Silver, re-
ceived for their handling of difficult situation with Sterling).
166. See Adi Joseph, Hawks GM Danny Ferry Takes Indefinite Leave in Wake of




168. See David Aldridge, Hawks Say No More Discipline for Ferry, NBA.COM (Sept.
9, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://hangtime.blogs.nba.com/2014/09/09/hawks-say-no-
more-discipline-for-ferry/; see also Kurt Helin, Hawks GM Danny Ferry to Face Internal
Disciplinary Action Over Comment He Repeated, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:45 AM),
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/09/08/hawks-gm-danny-ferry-
could-face-disciplinary-action-over-comment-he-repeated/.
169. See Michael Lee, Union Head Michele Roberts Shows She’ll Be Strong Advocate
for NBA Players, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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as legalized gambling.170  The power of the NBPA, and the players
themselves, can be attributable to several factors.  First, NBA players
have more cache and are simply more recognizable and marketable
than their NFL counterparts.171  Some of the reasons for this in-
clude the global popularity of the sports and its players, the greater
longevity of NBA players’ careers, and their ability to better build
brands based off of their style and personality.172  There is perhaps
no better representation than recently elected NBPA vice president
LeBron James.173  With James, one of the league’s premier stars
and perhaps its most recognizable face, now one of the faces of the
players association, the NBPA and its constituents are benefitting
greatly from the increased exposure and prominence NBA players
are afforded.174
In addition to this, NBA players derive some of their power
from the mere fact their skills are more fungible and their contracts
sports/union-head-michele-roberts-shows-shell-be-strong-advocate-for-nba-players/
2014/11/09/51580884-6844-11e4-bafd-6598192a448d_story.html.
170. See Blake Murphy, NBPA’s Roberts Clarifies Media Criticism: Not an Effort to
Curtail Access, THESCORE (Mar. 2, 2015, 3:31 PM), http://www.thescore.com/nba/
news/711657; David Purdum, NBPA Exploring Gambling Possibility, ESPN (Feb. 16,
2015, 3:14 PM), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/12334294/michele-rob-
erts-national-basketball-players-association-begins-talks-legalized-sports-gambling.
171. See Ryan Weisert, Chase Down Block: How the NBA is Catching the NFL, HP
BASKETBALL NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2014), http://midlevelexceptional.com/2014/11/
24/chase-block-nba-catching-nfl/.  As one commentator describes:
[t]he NBA is a stars’ league.  NBA players don’t wear hats or helmets.
Their faces are recognizable globally.  According to Forbes, of the 65
athletes worldwide who made at least $1 million in endorsements last
year, 15 were NBA players.  The NFL has less than half that many players
garnering seven figures in endorsements.  The best comparison for the
NBA in terms of star power is the European soccer, but even the best of
those leagues boast only a handful of truly global stars.  Put simply, the
NBA has more star power than any league on the planet.
Id.
172. See Cork Gaines, Cristiano Ronaldo is the Most Popular Athlete in the World
and it Isn’t Even Close, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2014, 12:38 PM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/cristiano-ronaldo-popular-athletes-2014-12; Jeff Nelson, The Long-
est Professional Sports Careers, THE ROOSEVELTS (July 22, 2013), http://www.rsvlts
.com/2013/07/22/longest-sports-careers/; Anthony J. Fredella, What the NFL Can
Learn From the NBA, STRAIGHTHOOPS.COM (Sept. 19, 2014), http://straighthoops
.com/take_note.html; see also NBA All-Stars Busy Building Brands Off Court During
Weekend in NY, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily
.com/Daily/Issues/2015/02/16/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/NBA-Players.aspx.
173. See Tom Withers & Antonio Gonzalez, LeBron Excited for New Role with
NBA Player’s Union, NBA.COM (Feb. 14, 2015, 6:41 PM), http://www.nba.com/
2015/news/02/14/all-star-notebook.ap/.
174. See Jeff Zillgitt, Lebron James Gives Union a Strong Voice, USA TODAY (Feb.
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are guaranteed.175  Unlike the rough world of the NFL, where ca-
reers last, on average, for 3.2 years, the NBA’s salary structure has
afforded players luxuries and a voice in the debate on player disci-
pline.176  Finally, there is a perception issue that affects both
leagues’ status in the public eye.  Despite both leagues leading in
arrest rates across professional sports, and the NBA suffering the
worst sports public relations nightmare of the past twenty years with
the “Malice at the Palace” incident, the NFL has a serious percep-
tion issue and has been seen, in recent years, as an increasingly vio-
lent sport played by violent individuals.177  Although the league’s
arrest rates are far lower than those of similar demographics in the
national population, the NFL and its players still suffer from this
perception, to an extent not experienced by the NBA or its play-
ers.178  These factors combine to create a unique, balanced discipli-
nary atmosphere within the NBA, one that has responded well to
unprecedented disciplinary scandals in the past year.
IV. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AS A UNIQUE WORKPLACE WITH
REGARDS TO PLAYER AND MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINE
From the analysis and examples above, two key differences
emerge with regards to player and management discipline in pro-
175. See NFL Total Access, Barkley: NBA Players More Talented than NFL Players,
NFL NETWORK, http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-network-total-access/09000d5d82
ab4642/Barkley-NBA-players-more-talented-than-NFL-players; see also Stephanie
Pelton, How Guaranteed NFL Contracts Could Change Football, UTEREVIEW.COM (June
9, 2014), http://utah.247sports.com/Article/How-guaranteed-NFL-contracts-
could-change-football-29044940.
176. See Dashiell Bennett, The NFL’s Official Spin on Average Career Length is a
Joke, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2011, 5:18 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
nfls-spin-average-career-length-2011-4; Zillgitt, supra note 174.
177. See Abigail Tracy, NFL, NBA Lead Arrest Rates Across Pro Sports, VOCATIV
.COM (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/culture/sport/nfl-ar-
rest-rates/; Kurt Helin, Looking Back, Stern Says “Malice at the Palace” Was Hardest
Thing He Faced, NBC SPORTS (Nov. 11, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://probasketballtalk
.nbcsports.com/2013/11/11/looking-back-stern-says-malice-in-the-palace-was-
hardest-thing-he-faced/; Lyons Yellin, Players Like Brees a Cure for NFL’s Perception
Problem, WWLTV.COM (Feb. 23, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.wwltv.com/story/
sports/nfl/saints/2014/09/17/new-orleans-saints-lyons-yellin/15810535/; Leo-
nard Shapiro, For Too Long, Sports Journalists Glossed Over Football’s Violence. I Was One
of Them, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
for-too-long-sports-journalists-glossed-over-footballs-violence-i-was-one-of-them/
2013/10/18/b5fc41d2-2f84-11e3-bbed-a8a60c601153_story.html.
178. See NFL Player Arrests, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/
arrests/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016); Benjamin Morris, The Rate of Domestic Violence
Arrests Among NFL Players, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 31, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://
fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-rate-of-domestic-violence-arrests-among-nfl-play-
ers/; Fredella, supra note 171; KEVIN YOUNG, SPORT, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIETY xi
(2012).
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fessional sports as compared to the common workplace environ-
ments.  The first is the notion of punishment with regards to the
power and role of publicity in disciplinary proceedings.  The sec-
ond distinguishing feature stems from the unique labor market of
professional sports as a franchised monopoly with high-skilled
workers.
A. Effect of Publicity on the Workplace
The non-sports workplace has less flexibility with regards to the
creation of disciplinary processes and the application of substantive
conduct policies than its sports employee discipline counterpart.
Implicating employment law in the non-sports context, employer’s
must avoid the following pitfalls before disciplining an employee
such as a blue collar worker: not following usual procedures, mak-
ing a disciplinary decision at a suspicious time, and treating simi-
larly situated employees differently.179  In a unionized setting also
implicating labor law concerns, an employer must always be cogni-
zant of the potential that a disciplinary action against an em-
ployee will result in the assertion that an unfair labor practice has
been committed.180  Generally, employers choose to adopt a com-
prehensive discipline policy, establish written work rules, or operate
on an ad hoc basis.181  The procedures and work rules are drafted
to avoid curtailing the employer’s right to terminate at-will employ-
ees and to avoid any interpretation that employees can be termi-
nated only for cause.182  The use of a broad morality clause and ad
hoc standards to discipline for on-the-field and off-the-field behav-
ior allows for flexibility in behavioral standards for professional ath-
lete discipline that would likely not survive scrutiny in the non-
sports employment context.
Indeed, sports commissioners, like Goodell and Silver, have le-
gitimate reasons for disciplining athletes and even owners for off-
field conduct.  First, there are economic realities to consider.  Fans
may attend fewer games due to a player’s behavior off the field and
corporations can drop sponsorships, the latter of which occurred
179. See SHARON P. STILLER, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NEW YORK § 2:76 (2d ed.
2012).
180. See id.
181. See Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Con-
tract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 351 (2008) (discussing the history of at-will
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during the Adrian Peterson scandal.183  Misbehavior by players and
owners can affect a team’s image and profitability unlike any other
industry.184  Part of this is due to the unmatched visibility and influ-
ence of not only players, who are among America’s biggest role
models for children, but also owners.185  Another part is the grow-
ing effect of social media and its role in connecting players and
teams to the public at-large in a novel and wholly revolutionary
manner.186  With the rise of social media has come a rise in public
interest in not only the actions and conduct of a player on the field
but off the field and in the locker room as well.187  The examples
above illustrate that professional sports take a different approach to
employee discipline due to their public nature.188
B. Franchised Monopolies with Highly-Skilled Workers
Both the NFL and the NBA operate through a franchise busi-
ness structure.189  Acting as the CEO of the league, the commis-
sioner is elected by the owners and is an employee of the league.190
Unlike a CEO, the commissioner’s powers emanate from the league
constitution and the owner’s do not delegate authority nor provide
direct supervision or control.191  Seemingly, “the employed Com-
missioner represents an almost autonomous authority within the in-
ternal structure of the league, uncontrolled by its principal
owners.”192  However, this autonomy has its limitations, and the
commissioner’s power to discipline in professional sports is limited
by the team ownership’s ability to hire and fire the commis-
sioner.193  This conflict of interest between the commissioner’s
183. See Darrell Rovell, Radisson Parts Ways with Vikings After Adrian Peterson’s
Ordeal, ESPN (July 21, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/13296797/
radisson-renew-minnesota-vikings-sponsorship-adrian-peterson-ordeal.
184. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 182–83.
185. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 3, at 594; see also Edelman, supra note 2, at
661.
186. See RONALD B. WOODS, SOCIAL ISSUES IN SPORT 96 (3d ed. 2016); Zolan V.
Kanno-Youngs, NFL Players Walk Tricky Line Because of Blurry Rules on Social Media,
USA TODAY (July 9, 2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/
2015/07/08/social-media-policy-twitter-facebook/29477163/.
187. See MARK WYSOCKI, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN SPORTS COMMUNICA-
TION: AN ANALYSIS OF NBA TEAMS’ STRATEGY, 8–10 (2012).
188. For further information on approaches to employee discipline, see infra
notes 75 to 144 and accompanying text.
189. See Lentze, supra note 30, at 68–69.
190. See NFL CONST., supra note 8, at art. VIII, § 8.1 (b); see also NBA CONST.,
supra note 8, at § 24(a).
191. See Lentze, supra note 30, at 72.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 68–69.  As one commentator has observed:
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power to discipline while maintaining his or her own self-interest
can pressure the commissioner into taking differing disciplinary ac-
tions for players than for owners.194
The lack of commissioner discipline of Danny Ferry juxtaposes
this tension.195  While Ferry is an employee of the Atlanta Hawks,
the NBA commissioner has the power to discipline him for his ra-
cist speech during the June conference call.196  However, the com-
missioner’s office used self-reporting and self-discipline in that
instance.  Perhaps the commissioner’s office allows for internal dis-
cipline for two reasons.  First, the lack of collective bargaining for
NBA management giving leeway for different punishment struc-
tures.  Second, and more importantly, the role of management in
less public-facing is distinct from player actions which directly puts
the marketability of the league product at stake.
It is most useful to use analogies to understand the non-sports
approach to franchise discipline before further examining the NBA
and NFL systems.  If Donald Sterling were a McDonald’s franchise
owner and the owner of an NBA team, his punishment for his pri-
vate conversation would be not only the maximum fine allowed
under his franchise contract, but also revocation of his franchise
license by the other franchisees.  In a non-sports context, the
franchise contract would have to include such a broad standard of
conduct for private actions that would have to survive both the con-
tract dispute and any applicable First Amendment scrutiny.197
The [NFL] Commissioner is elected by the owners and possesses discipli-
nary power, dispute resolution authority, and decision-making authority,
including the power to appoint other officers and committees.  . . .
. . . .
. . . [The NBA and National Hockey League] have an elected Commis-
sioner with similar power and the owners are organized in a common
council, called the “Board of Governors.”
Id.
194. See Id. at 81.  As one author summarizes:
On the one hand, the Commissioner has the power to supervise, sanc-
tion, and even suspend team owners under the power of the ‘best inter-
ests’ clause. On the other hand, the Commissioner is an employee of the
league and, thus, employed and elected by the owners who determine the
Commissioner’s term and compensation. Ironically, the Commissioner,
as an employee, has the disciplinary power over his own employer.
Id.
195. For further discussion regarding Danny Ferry, see supra notes 84-89.
196. See id.
197. See Deborah S. Coldwell et al., Franchise Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 1349 (2006)
(“Franchisors are frequently confronted with legal challenges from franchisees
when they attempt to terminate a franchise too quickly or without just cause. . . .”).
But see Darren A. Heitner & Richard Bogart, Personal Foul: Conduct Detrimental to the
Team. Penalty Declined?, 5 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 215, 220 (2014) (citing
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976)) (discussing in player discipline con-
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In the professional sports context, even when the outcome of
disciplinary action against an owner is harsh, the commissioner’s
power to discipline is not foolproof delegation.  In simple terms,
the delegation comes with strings attached because the owners are
still the commissioner’s bosses.  At first glance, the discipline of
Donald Sterling would be an instance of the commissioner’s ability
to utilize the “best interest of the game” power to discipline a
franchise owner.198  However, the Donald Sterling incident exem-
plifies the impact of ownership power on disciplinary process, as
there were numerous behind the curtain discussions of the owners
before discipline was handed down to Sterling.199  Essentially, the
owners themselves disciplined Sterling, utilizing the commissioner
as the tool for their collective voice.  Continuing the McDonald’s
franchise analogy above, the organization of sports leagues creates
a specific owner-to-owner disciplinary pressure dissimilar to other
franchise models.
For professional athletes, the unilateral discipline schemes of
the NFL and NBA commissioners’ offices provide a unique contrast
between the positions of management and workers.  Unlike em-
ployees in traditional, non-sports workplace settings, “[a]thletes are
uniquely skilled laborers whose skills are non-transferable to any
other industry and whose physical abilities are transient.”200  The
players unions most resemble those in the “entertainment industry
where the membership consists of highly skilled professionals with
needs,[such as free agency and salary caps,] not typically shared by
the stereotypical blue collar worker.”201  Regardless of the ability of
the NFLPA or NBPA to negotiate terms for their members, the
NBA’s and NFL’s monopolies and monopsony in the labor market
for their respective sports in the United States create limited oppor-
text that First Amendment free speech protection does not extend to private
entities).
198. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 1645.
199. See Eliana Dockterman, NBA Owners Meet to Discuss Donald Sterling Problem,
TIME (May 1, 2014), http://time.com/85311/nba-owners-meet-donald-sterling-
clippers-ownership/; see also Elliot Hannon, NBA Owners Panel Unanimously Approves
Sterling Termination Plan, SLATE (May 2, 2014, 12:08 AM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2014/05/02/nba_owners_approve_plan_to_oust_donald_sterl
ing.html/.
200. David Sirotkin, Note, Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional
Sports: An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Com-
missioners, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 289, 290 (2009).
201. Alfred G. Feliu, Foreword: Discipline in Professional Sports, 17 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 129, 130 (1999) (citing Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining,
Antitrust Law, & Team Sports: The Contingent Choice of Broad Exemption, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1663, 1710 (1997)).
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tunities for athletes to sell or market their skills.202  Due to the in-
herent constraints of this workplace and the market for athlete
labor, the current structure of player discipline suffers from a
unique inherent failure of complete work deprivation.
A comparison of the Jim Irsay fine and the Ray Rice suspension
illustrate this critical difference ownership and player punishments
in professional sports.  The suspension of a player not only removes
the player from the field of play, but it also docks that player for his
salary for those games.203  Jim Irsay was fined $500,000 for his be-
havior; however, initially levying an indefinite suspension upon Ray
Rice was effectively fining him $233,333 per game or about $4 mil-
lion for the entire season.204  When the Commissioner of a league
suspends, fines, or expels players, the Commissioner is effectively
eliminating players’ abilities to earn a living in that sport for a pe-
riod of time.205
V. THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
It is well established that, from a labor context, professional
sports leagues in America are indeed treated in a special man-
ner.206  Whether by legal victories or general custom, leagues like
the NFL and the NBA have developed this small niche in labor law
and are able to operate in a different manner from almost any
other management and employee context.207  But what is the effect
of this special distinction in today’s evolving world? Where is com-
missioner discipline heading in the aftermath of the tumultuous
year of commissioner discipline in 2014?
For the NBA and the NFL, the headline-grabbing personnel
stories from the past year demonstrate the effect that the growing
reach of the media and digital expansion is having on sports disci-
202. See Jocelyn Sum, Note, Clarett v. National Football League, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 807, 824, 824 n.121 (2005); see also Marks, supra note 1, at 1598.  The
“Ricky Williams Rule” also prohibits a player suspended by the NFL to play in the
Canadian Football League.  See Marks, supra note 1, at 1604.
203. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 181–183 (detailing manner in which players
are suspended and wide range of “punishable material” that supports such
suspensions).
204. See Jamison Hensley, Ray Rice, Ravens Reach Settlement, ESPN (Jan. 16,
2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12171911/ray-rice-baltmore-ravens-
reach-settlement-regarding-back-pay.
205. See David Sirotkin, Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports:
An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commission-
ers, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 289, 304-05 (2009).
206. See Pacifici, supra note 42, at 93-95 (discussing the power of sports com-
missioners moving into “uncharted” territory).
207. See id.
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pline and scandal in the 21st century.  Juxtaposing the two positions
of the leagues as we have done highlights how these organizations
are handling this change and adapting for an unknown future.  In
the NFL, player discipline on the part of commissioner Roger
Goodell has continued unabated and has generated headlines, in-
cluding ones particularly damaging for the commissioner him-
self.208  The photographs of Jim Irsay’s arrest, the Ray Rice video
tape and the photographs of Adrian Peterson’s abusive behavior
were splashed across the headlines in a manner unlike any sports
scandal previously.  In response, Goodell was left, in some respects,
scrambling to keep up with the speed, complexity, and reaction to
the information being released.209  The NFL commissioner’s office
has been heavily criticized for their handling of each of these
cases.210  While there have been some post-hoc updates to their dis-
ciplinary system, particularly involving domestic abuse cases, the
NFL’s system of discipline has been criticized as lacking and it ap-
pears that the commissioner office is playing a dangerous game of
catch-up in a league, and indeed a world, where scandals can erupt
quickly.211
In parallel, NBA commissioner Adam Silver has been lauded
for his handling of several NBA scandals in 2014.212  The action the
commissioner took in the Donald Sterling case was described as
208. Bob Glauber, Roger Goodell’s Bungled Discipline of Ray Rice Has Put Commis-
sioner in the Spotlight, NEWSDAY (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/sports/
columnists/bob-glauber/roger-goodell-s-bungled-discipline-of-ray-rice-has-put-
commissioner-in-spotlight-1.9665555.
209. See Margaret Hartmann, NFL Shares New Goodell Excuse, CBS Tries Less Of-
fensive Ray Rice Response, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:45 AM), http://nymag
.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/after-new-goodell-excuse-cbs-sets-example
.html; Matt Carroll, Roger Goodell Responds to NFLPA Criticism, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 29, 2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/roger-
goodell-nflpa-criticsm_n_5414847.html.
210. See, e.g., Steve Almasy & Ashley Fantz, NFL Chief Roger Goodell Faces Intense
Criticism After Ray Rice Video, CNN (Sept. 16, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/
09/09/us/nfl-ray-rice-criticism/; Criticism of NFL Grows in Wake of Ray Rice Case,
NPR (Sept. 12, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/348010285/crit-
icism-of-nfl-grows-in-wake-of-ray-rice-case.
211. See Ryan Wilson, NFLPA President: Goodell’s Credibility ‘Definitely Lacking’
with Players, CBSSPORTS.COM (Nov. 30, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/
nfl/eye-on-football/24851272/nfpla-president-goodells-credibility-definitely-lack-
ing-with-players.
212. See Nina Mandell, NBA Team Owners Applaud Adam Silver’s Decision, USA
TODAY (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/04/nba-team-
owners-applaud-adam-silvers-decision; see also Larry Fine, NBA Commissioner Silver
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“swift” and unrelenting.213  The uncompromising nature of the dis-
cipline further forced other owners, including Bruce Levenson, to
examine the situation and make their own admissions.214  Whether
by legal victories or general custom, leagues like the NFL and the
NBA have developed this small niche in labor law and are able to
operate in a different manner from almost any other management
and employee context.215  But what is the effect of this special dis-
tinction in today’s evolving world? Where is commissioner disci-
pline heading in the aftermath of the tumultuous year of
commissioner discipline in 2014?
Silver’s decisive actions have benefitted the league immensely
and have solidly upheld the commissioner’s mandate to protect the
best interests of the game and ensure its healthy perpetuation.216
As Goodell has appeared to falter on the question of discipline and
in reaction to quickly-developing scandals, Silver has taken the sort
of action that is required of sports commissioners in today’s fast-
moving world.
There are two practical reasons behind Silver’s ability to ad-
dress these new-age problems: his well-defined authority and the
unparalleled process of arbitration afforded NBA players and own-
ers.217  These two characteristics of the NBA’s disciplinary process
undoubtedly play a huge role in Silver’s ability to address threats
quickly and with the integrity that comes with a system of true due
process.  On the other hand, Goodell appears hamstrung by the
structure of discipline currently in place within the NFL, which was
overhauled in late 2014.218  Goodell certainly has the broadest pow-
ers of the four major professional sports leagues commissioners.219
However, the integral role of the NFL Executive Committee, the
lack of outside oversight, the recently overhauled disciplinary pro-
cess, and the messy appeals structure has led to a broken system of
213. See Craig Wolff, Donald Sterling Scandal: Adam Silver’s Swift, Severe Actions
Receive Praise from League, NJ.COM (Apr. 29, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://www.nj.com/
nets/index.ssf/2014/04/donald_sterling_scandal_adam_silvers_swift_severe_ac
tions_receive_praise_from_league.html; see also Scott Ostler, Adam Silver’s Ruling on
Donald Sterling was Swift and Sure, SF GATE (Apr. 30, 2014, 6:36 AM), http://www
.sfgate.com/sports/ostler/article/Adam-Silver-s-ruling-on-Donald-Sterling-was-
swift-5440311.php.
214. See Brandon Schlager, Danny Ferry to be Disciplined in Fallout of Levenson
Email, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:09 PM), http://www.sportingnews.com/
nba/story/2014-09-08/danny-ferry-will-be-disciplined-in-levenson-email-fallout.
215. See id.
216. See Zillgitt, supra note 173.
217. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 185–89.
218. See Myers, supra note 121.
219. See Pacifici, supra note 42, at 105.
39
Lee and McFarlin: Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: Comparative Analysis of Manage
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
108 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 69
discipline within the NFL, one that has been described as
“flawed.”220  The complex scandals that rocked in the league in
2014 were the first cracks in the armor and displayed how unpre-
pared the NFL seems to deal with a changing sports consumer and
media marketplace.
Sports commissioners are entrusted with a special brand of dis-
ciplinary authority.  Due to the special status of sports leagues, not
only in labor and antitrust law but also in the public consciousness,
much of employee and management discipline comes down to the
office of the commissioner and the power rests on the shoulders of
one person.221  It is a unique system and one that has, in the past,
generated significant debate, analysis, and criticism.222  And as we
experience a rise of the success and ubiquity of an invasive, digital
media and swift public reaction, it is only more imperative that
commissioner approach management and employee discipline and
punishment from a new and evolving light.  No longer are conver-
sations being had behind closed doors.  Personal scandals, such as
those of Donald Sterling and Ray Rice, are now playing out in full
public view.223  We are experiencing an evolution in sports disci-
pline, one that maintains many of the principles that make it
unique while also reacting to greater public awareness and con-
sumption.  It is a brave new world and league commissioners must
be ready and willing to embrace and solve the problems that are yet
to come.
220. See id. at 106.
221. See Pollack, supra note 4, at 1646–49.
222. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 183.
223. Abraham Madkour, Will Scandal Permanently Alter NFL’s Public Image?,
SPORTS BUS. J. (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Is-
sues/2014/09/15/Opinion/From-the-Executive-Editor.aspx.
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